EILEEN M. DECKER 1 United States Attorney 2 LAWRENCE S. MIDDLETON Assistant United States Attorney 3 Chief, Criminal Division DENNISE D. WILLETT **Under Seal** Assistant United States Attorney 4 Chief, Santa Ana Branch Office JOSHUA M. ROBBINS (Cal. Bar No. 270553) 5 SCOTT D. TENLEY (Cal. Bar No. 298911) 6 Assistant United States Attorneys ASHWIN JANAKIRAM (Cal. Bar No. 277513) 7 Special Assistant United States Attorney 8000 United States Courthouse 8 411 West Fourth Street Santa Ana, California 92701 Telephone: (714) 338-2829 9 Facsimile: (714) 338-3561 E-mail: 10 scott.tenley@usdoj.gov 11 Attorneys for Plaintiff UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 12 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 13 FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 14 SOUTHERN DIVISION 15 16 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. SA CR 15-155-UA 17 Plaintiff, AMENDED PLEA AGREEMENT FOR DEFENDANT MICHAEL R. DROBOT 18 v. 19 MICHAEL R. DROBOT, 20 Defendant. 21 22 This constitutes the plea agreement between MICHAEL R. DROBOT ("defendant") and the United States Attorney's Office for the 23 24 Central District of California (the "USAO") in the above-captioned 25 case. The United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District 26 of Alabama also agrees to be bound by this plea agreement so long as

the defendant agrees to cooperate fully with that district as well.

This agreement cannot bind any other federal, state, local, or

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foreign prosecuting, enforcement, administrative, or regulatory authorities.

DEFENDANT'S OBLIGATIONS

2. Defendant agrees to:

- a. Give up the right to indictment by a grand jury and, at the earliest opportunity requested by the USAO and provided by the Court, appear and plead guilty to both counts of the two-count information filed in <u>United States v. Michael R. Drobot</u>, No. SA CR 15-155-UA, which charges defendant with Conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, and Illegal Remunerations for Health Care Referrals, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(2)(A).
 - b. Not contest facts agreed to in this agreement.
- c. Abide by all agreements regarding sentencing contained in this agreement.
- d. Appear for all court appearances, surrender as ordered for service of sentence, obey all conditions of any bond, and obey any other ongoing court order in this matter.
- e. Not commit any crime; however, offenses that would be excluded for sentencing purposes under United States Sentencing Guidelines ("U.S.S.G." or "Sentencing Guidelines") § 4A1.2(c) are not within the scope of this agreement.
- f. Be truthful at all times with Pretrial Services, the United States Probation Office, and the Court.
- g. Pay the applicable special assessments at or before the time of sentencing unless defendant lacks the ability to pay and prior to sentencing submits a completed financial statement on a form to be provided by the USAO.
 - 3. Defendant further agrees:

- a. Truthfully to disclose to law enforcement officials, at a date and time to be set by the USAO, the location of, defendant's ownership interest in, and all other information known to defendant about, all monies, properties, and/or assets of any kind, derived from or acquired as a result of, or used to facilitate the commission of, defendant's illegal activities, and to forfeit all right, title, and interest in and to such items.
- b. To the Court's entry of an order of forfeiture at or before sentencing with respect to these assets and to the forfeiture of the assets.
- c. To take whatever steps are necessary to pass to the United States clear title to the assets described above, including, without limitation, the execution of a consent decree of forfeiture and the completing of any other legal documents required for the transfer of title to the United States.
- d. Not to contest any administrative forfeiture proceedings or civil judicial proceedings commenced by the United States of America against these properties.
- e. Not to assist any other individual in any effort falsely to contest the forfeiture of the assets described above.
- f. Not to claim that reasonable cause to seize the assets was lacking.
- g. To prevent the transfer, sale, destruction, or loss of any and all assets described above to the extent defendant has the ability to do so.
- h. To fill out and deliver to the USAO a completed financial statement listing defendant's assets on a form provided by the USAO.

- Defendant further agrees to cooperate fully with the USAO, 4. the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Alabama, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the United States Postal Inspection Service - Office of the Inspector General, the Internal Revenue Service, and, as directed by the USAO, any other federal, state, local, or foreign prosecuting, enforcement, administrative, or regulatory authority. This cooperation requires defendant to:
 - a. Respond truthfully and completely to all questions that may be put to defendant, whether in interviews, before a grand jury, or at any trial or other court proceeding.
 - b. Attend all meetings, grand jury sessions, trials or other proceedings at which defendant's presence is requested by the USAO or compelled by subpoena or court order.
 - c. Produce voluntarily all documents, records, or other tangible evidence relating to matters about which the USAO, or its designee, inquires.
 - 5. For purposes of this agreement: (1) "Cooperation Information" shall mean any statements made, or documents, records, tangible evidence, or other information provided, by defendant pursuant to defendant's cooperation under this agreement; and (2) "Plea Information" shall mean any statements made by defendant, under oath, at the guilty plea hearing and the agreed to factual basis statement in this agreement.

THE USAO'S OBLIGATIONS

- 6. The USAO agrees to:
 - a. Not contest facts agreed to in this agreement.

- b. Abide by all agreements regarding sentencing contained in this agreement.
- c. At the time of sentencing, provided that defendant demonstrates an acceptance of responsibility for the offenses up to and including the time of sentencing, recommend a two-level reduction in the applicable Sentencing Guidelines offense level, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, and recommend and, if necessary, move for an additional one-level reduction if available under that section.
- d. Recommend that defendant be sentenced to a term of imprisonment no higher than the low end of the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range, provided that the offense level used by the Court to determine that range is 31 or higher and provided that the Court does not depart downward in offense level or criminal history category. For purposes of this agreement, the low end of the Sentencing Guidelines range is that defined by the Sentencing Table in U.S.S.G. Chapter 5, Part A.
- e. Except for criminal tax violations (including conspiracy to commit such violations chargeable under 18 U.S.C. § 371), not further criminally prosecute defendant for violations arising out of defendant's conduct described in the agreed-to factual basis set forth in paragraph 22 below. Defendant understands that the USAO is free to criminally prosecute defendant for any other unlawful past conduct or any unlawful conduct that occurs after the date of this agreement. Defendant agrees that at the time of sentencing the Court may consider the uncharged conduct in determining the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range, the propriety and extent of any departure from that range, and the sentence to be

imposed after consideration of the Sentencing Guidelines and all other relevant factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

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The parties further understand that the Fraud Section of the Civil Division of the United States Department of Justice has represented that should defendant enter a guilty plea pursuant to this agreement, it has no present intention to pursue civil action against defendant arising out of defendant's conduct described in the agreed-to factual basis set forth in paragraph 22 below ("factual The parties further understand that the California Department of Insurance has represented that it does not intend to refer conduct described in the factual basis to California state prosecutorial agencies, on its own initiative, for additional criminal prosecution. If a prosecutorial agency requests information regarding the California Department of Insurance's investigation of facts or circumstances related to the factual basis, the California Department of Insurance will cooperate with that prosecutorial agency and present any evidence in its possession. Defendant, however, understands that neither the Fraud Section of the Civil Division of the Department of Justice or the California Department of Insurance is bound by this agreement, and their decision to forego such action is not a condition of this agreement.

7. The USAO further agrees:

a. Not to offer as evidence in its case-in-chief in the above-captioned case or any other criminal prosecution that may be brought against defendant by the USAO, or in connection with any sentencing proceeding in any criminal case that may be brought against defendant by the USAO, any Cooperation Information.

Defendant agrees, however, that the USAO may use both Cooperation

Information and Plea Information: (1) to obtain and pursue leads to other evidence, which evidence may be used for any purpose, including any criminal prosecution of defendant; (2) to cross-examine defendant should defendant testify, or to rebut any evidence offered, or argument or representation made, by defendant, defendant's counsel, or a witness called by defendant in any trial, sentencing hearing, or other court proceeding; and (3) in any criminal prosecution of defendant for false statement, obstruction of justice, or perjury.

- b. Not to use Cooperation Information against defendant at sentencing for the purpose of determining the applicable guideline range, including the appropriateness of an upward departure, or the sentence to be imposed, and to recommend to the Court that Cooperation Information not be used in determining the applicable guideline range or the sentence to be imposed. Defendant understands, however, that Cooperation Information will be disclosed to the probation office and the Court, and that the Court may use Cooperation Information for the purposes set forth in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.8(b) and for determining the sentence to be imposed.
- c. In connection with defendant's sentencing, to bring to the Court's attention the nature and extent of defendant's cooperation.
- d. If the USAO determines, in its exclusive judgment, that defendant has both complied with defendant's obligations under paragraphs 2 and 3 above and provided substantial assistance to law enforcement in the prosecution or investigation of another ("substantial assistance"), to move the Court pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 to fix an offense level and corresponding guideline range

below that otherwise dictated by the sentencing guidelines, and to recommend a term of imprisonment within this reduced range.

DEFENDANT'S UNDERSTANDINGS REGARDING COOPERATION

8. Defendant understands the following:

- a. Any knowingly false or misleading statement by defendant will subject defendant to prosecution for false statement, obstruction of justice, and perjury and will constitute a breach by defendant of this agreement.
- b. Nothing in this agreement requires the USAO or any other prosecuting, enforcement, administrative, or regulatory authority to accept any cooperation or assistance that defendant may offer, or to use it in any particular way.
- c. Defendant cannot withdraw defendant's guilty pleas if the USAO does not make a motion pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 for a reduced guideline range or if the USAO makes such a motion and the Court does not grant it or if the Court grants such a USAO motion but elects to sentence above the reduced range.
- d. At this time the USAO makes no agreement or representation as to whether any cooperation that defendant has provided or intends to provide constitutes or will constitute substantial assistance. The decision whether defendant has provided substantial assistance will rest solely within the exclusive judgment of the USAO.
- e. The USAO's determination whether defendant has provided substantial assistance will not depend in any way on whether the government prevails at any trial or court hearing in which defendant testifies or in which the government otherwise presents information resulting from defendant's cooperation.

NATURE OF THE OFFENSES

- Defendant understands that for defendant to be guilty of 9. the crime charged in count one, that is, Conspiracy, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 371, the following must be (1) Beginning no later than in or around 2007, and continuing to in or around November 2013, there was an agreement between two or more persons to commit Mail Fraud and Honest Services Mail Fraud, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1341 and 1346, Interstate Travel in Aid of a Racketeering Enterprise, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1952(a)(3), Monetary Transactions in Property Derived from Specified Unlawful Activity, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1957, and Payment or Receipt of Kickbacks in Connection with a Federal Health Care Program, in violation of Title 42, United States Code, Section 1320a-7b(b)(2)(A); (2) defendant became a member of the conspiracy knowing of at least one of its objects and intending to help accomplish it; and (3) one of the members of the conspiracy performed at least one overt act for the purpose of carrying out the conspiracy.
- 10. Defendant understands that Mail Fraud, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1341, has the following elements: (1) the defendant knowingly devised or participated in a scheme or plan to defraud, or a scheme or plan for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations or promises; (2) the statements made or facts omitted as part of the scheme were material, that is, they had a natural tendency to influence, or were capable of influencing, a person to part with money or property; (3) the defendant acted with the intent to

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defraud; and (4) the defendant used, or caused to be used, the mails to carry out or attempt to carry out an essential part of the scheme.

- 11. Defendant further understands that Honest Services Mail
 Fraud, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1341
 and 1346, has the following elements: (1) the defendant devised or
 participated in a scheme or plan to deprive a patient of his or her
 right to honest services; (2) the scheme or plan consisted of a bribe
 or kickback in exchange for medical services; (3) a medical
 professional person owed a fiduciary duty to the patient; (4) the
 defendant acted with the intent to defraud by depriving the patient
 of his or her right of honest services; (5) the defendant's act was
 material, that is, it had a natural tendency to influence, or was
 capable of influencing, a person's acts; and (6) the defendant used,
 or caused someone to use, the mails to carry out or attempt to carry
 out the scheme or plan.
- 12. Defendant further understands that Interstate Travel in Aid of a Racketeering Enterprise, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1952(a)(3), has the following elements: (1) defendant used the mail or a facility of interstate commerce with the intent to promote, manage, establish, or carry on, or facilitate the promotion, management, establishment, or carrying on, of unlawful activity, specifically payment and receipt of kickbacks in violation of California Business & Professions Code § 650, California Insurance Code § 750, and California Labor Code § 3215; and (2) after doing so, defendant performed or attempted to perform an act to promote, manage, establish, or carry on, or facilitate the promotion, management, establishment, or carrying on, of such unlawful activity.

14. Defendant further understands that for defendant to be guilty of the crime charged in count two of the information, that is, Payment of Kickbacks in Connection with a Federal Health Care Program, in violation of Title 42, United States Code, Section 1320a-7b(b)(2)(A), the following must be true: (1) defendant knowingly and willfully paid remuneration, directly or indirectly, in cash or in kind, to another person; (2) the remuneration was given to induce that person to refer an individual for the furnishing or arranging for the furnishing of any item or service for which payment may be made in whole or in part under a Federal health care program; and (3) defendant knew that such payment of remuneration was illegal.

PENALTIES AND RESTITUTION

- 15. Defendant understands that the statutory maximum sentence that the Court can impose for a violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 371, is: 5 years imprisonment; a 3-year period of supervised release; a fine of \$250,000 or twice the gross gain or gross loss resulting from the offense, whichever is greatest; and a mandatory special assessment of \$100.
- 16. Defendant understands that the statutory maximum sentence that the Court can impose for a violation of Title 42, United States Code, Section 1320a-7b(b)(2)(A), is: 5 years imprisonment; a 3-year

period of supervised release; a fine of \$250,000 or twice the gross gain or gross loss resulting from the offense, whichever is greatest; and a mandatory special assessment of \$100.

- 17. Defendant understands, therefore, that the total maximum sentence for all offenses to which defendant is pleading guilty is:
 10 years imprisonment; a 3-year period of supervised release; a fine of \$500,000 or twice the gross gain or gross loss resulting from the offenses, whichever is greatest; and a mandatory special assessment of \$200.
- 18. Defendant understands that supervised release is a period of time following imprisonment during which defendant will be subject to various restrictions and requirements. Defendant understands that if defendant violates one or more of the conditions of any supervised release imposed, defendant may be returned to prison for all or part of the term of supervised release authorized by statute for the offense that resulted in the term of supervised release, which could result in defendant serving a total term of imprisonment greater than the statutory maximum stated above.
- 19. Defendant understands that, by pleading guilty, defendant may be giving up valuable government benefits and valuable civic rights, such as the right to vote, the right to possess a firearm, the right to hold office, and the right to serve on a jury.

 Defendant understands that once the court accepts defendant's guilty plea, it will be a federal felony for defendant to possess a firearm or ammunition. Defendant understands that the conviction in this case may also subject defendant to various other collateral consequences, including but not limited to revocation of probation, parole, or supervised release in another case and suspension or

revocation of a professional license. Defendant understands that unanticipated collateral consequences will not serve as grounds to withdraw defendant's guilty plea.

- 20. Defendant understands that, if defendant is not a United States citizen, the felony conviction in this case may subject defendant to: removal, also known as deportation, which may, under some circumstances, be mandatory; denial of citizenship; and denial of admission to the United States in the future. The court cannot, and defendant's attorney also may not be able to, advise defendant fully regarding the immigration consequences of the felony conviction in this case. Defendant understands that unexpected immigration consequences will not serve as grounds to withdraw defendant's guilty plea.
- 21. Defendant understands that defendant will be required to pay full restitution to the victims of the offenses to which defendant is pleading guilty. Defendant agrees that, in return for the USAO's compliance with its obligations under this agreement, the Court may order restitution to persons other than the victims of the offenses to which defendant is pleading guilty and in amounts greater than those alleged in the counts to which defendant is pleading guilty. In particular, defendant agrees that the Court may order restitution to any victim of any of the following for any losses suffered by that victim as a result: (a) any relevant conduct, as defined in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, in connection with the offenses to which defendant is pleading guilty; and (b) any charges not prosecuted pursuant to this agreement as well as all relevant conduct, as defined in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, in connection with those counts and

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charges. The parties have not come to an agreement on the amount of restitution.

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FACTUAL BASIS

22. Defendant admits that defendant is, in fact, guilty of the offenses to which defendant is agreeing to plead guilty. Defendant and the USAO agree to the statement of facts provided below and agree that this statement of facts is sufficient to support pleas of guilty to the charges described in this agreement and to establish the Sentencing Guidelines factors set forth in paragraph 24 below but is not meant to be a complete recitation of all facts relevant to the underlying criminal conduct or all facts known to either party that relate to that conduct.

Pacific Hospital of Long Beach ("Pacific Hospital") was a hospital located in Long Beach, California, specializing in surgeries, particularly spinal and orthopedic surgeries. From at least in or around 1997 to October 2013, Pacific Hospital was owned and/or operated by Michael D. Drobot ("Drobot Senior"). Drobot Senior also owned and/or operated Pacific Specialty Physician Management, Inc. ("PSPM"), a physician practice management company, and two companies that managed in-house pharmaceutical dispensary programs on behalf of doctors: California Pharmacy Management LLC ("CPM") and Industrial Pharmacy Management LLC ("IPM") (collectively, the "Dispensary Management Companies"). Beginning in or around 2003, defendant operated CPM under the direction of Drobot Senior, with CPM ceasing operations around 2007. From 2007 to 2010, defendant and Drobot Senior together owned, and defendant operated, IPM. From 2010 to at least November 2013, defendant was the majority owner of IPM, and controlled and directed its operations.

A. The Hospital Kickback Scheme

Beginning no later than 2001 and continuing through in or around November 2013, Drobot Senior, along with others working for Pacific Hospital, the Dispensary Companies, PSPM, and related companies, conspired with dozens of doctors, chiropractors, marketers, and others to pay kickbacks in return for those persons to refer thousands of patients to Pacific Hospital for spinal surgeries and other medical services paid for primarily through the Federal Employees' Compensation Act ("FECA") and the California Workers' Compensation System ("CWCS"). In paying the kickbacks and submitting the resulting claims for spinal surgeries and medical services, including through the mails, the conspirators acted with the intent to defraud workers' compensation insurance carriers and to deprive the patients of their right of honest services. In particular, the conspirators knew that by paying kickbacks to doctors and chiropractors who treated workers' compensation patients, they were inducing the provision of spinal surgeries and other medical services which could be paid for by a Federal health care program.

Beginning no later than in or around 2007 and continuing to in or around 2013, in Orange and Los Angeles Counties, within the Central District of California, and elsewhere, defendant, together with other co-conspirators known and unknown to the United States Attorney, knowingly combined, conspired, and agreed to commit the following offenses against the United States in connection with the above-described hospital kickback scheme: Mail Fraud and Honest Services Mail Fraud, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1341 and 1346, Interstate Travel in Aid of a Racketeering Enterprise, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section

1952(a)(3), Monetary Transactions in Property Derived from Specified Unlawful Activity, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1957, and Payment or Receipt of Kickbacks in Connection with a Federal Health Care Program, in violation of Title 42, United States Code, Section 1320a-7b(b)(2)(A).

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As defendant knew, the hospital kickback scheme operated as follows: Drobot Senior and other co-conspirators offered to pay kickbacks to doctors, chiropractors, marketers, and others (the "kickback recipients") in return for their referring workers' compensation patients to Pacific Hospital for spinal surgeries, other types of surgeries, magnetic resonance imaging, toxicology, durable medical equipment, and other services which would be paid through FECA and the CWCS. As of approximately 2009, for spinal surgeries, kickback recipients were typically paid \$15,000 per lumbar fusion surgery and \$10,000 per cervical fusion surgery, provided that the surgeon used in the surgery hardware supplied by a specified distributor.

Influenced by the promise of kickbacks, the kickback recipients referred patients insured through the CWCS and the FECA to Pacific Hospital for spinal surgeries, other types of surgeries, and other medical services. In some cases, the patients lived dozens or hundreds of miles from Pacific Hospital, and closer to other qualified medical facilities. The workers' compensation patients were not informed that the medical professionals had been offered kickbacks to induce them to refer the surgeries to Pacific Hospital.

Defendant knew that it was illegal to pay or receive kickbacks for the referral of patients for medical services. Defendant also knew that the insurance carriers would be unwilling to pay claims for

medical services that were obtained through such illegal kickbacks.

However, as defendant knew, his co-conspirators deliberately did not disclose to the insurance carriers the kickback payments.

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Further, as defendant knew, to conceal the illegal kickback payments from the workers' compensation insurance carriers and patients, defendant's co-conspirators entered into bogus contracts under which the kickback recipients purported to provide services to Drobot Senior's companies to justify the kickback payments. services and other items of value discussed in those contracts were, in fact, generally not provided to Pacific Hospital or the other companies, or were provided at highly inflated prices. compensation to the kickback recipients was actually based on the number and type of surgeries they referred to the hospital. contracts included, among others, the following: collection agreements, option agreements, research and development agreements, lease and rental agreements, marketing agreements, and management agreements. Defendant learned the details of the hospital kickback scheme by, among other means, participating in weekly executive management meetings with Drobot Senior and other co-conspirators, in which the conspirators discussed the details and status of the kickback agreements with various doctors, chiropractors, and marketers.

Defendant's primary role in the conspiracy involved his operation of the Dispensary Management Companies. In or around 2003, defendant became the chief operating officer ("COO") of CPM, acting under the direction of Drobot Senior. CPM managed pharmaceutical dispensaries located in doctors' and chiropractors' offices, which dispensed medication to those doctors' and chiropractors' patients.

The conspirators used CPM as a vehicle to pay certain doctors and chiropractors kickbacks for referring patients to Pacific Hospital for spine surgeries and other services, and used the CPM dispensary management contracts to cover up the true nature of the kickback payments. When IPM was formed in or about 2005, the conspirators used it in a similar manner.

After he became the COO of CPM, defendant learned that Drobot Senior and his co-conspirators were using CPM to facilitate the kickback arrangements. Beginning in or around 2005, defendant himself began directly soliciting doctors and chiropractors to enter into contracts with CPM. In a number of cases, defendant discussed with the doctors and chiropractors their interest in receiving kickbacks in exchange for referring patients to Pacific Hospital for spinal surgeries, and he introduced them to Drobot Senior to negotiate the details of the arrangements.

In some cases, beginning in or around 2007, defendant also acted as a liaison between certain kickback recipients on the one hand and Drobot Senior and the other co-conspirators on the other hand. For example, when kickback recipients complained to defendant that Drobot Senior and other co-conspirators were not paying kickbacks on time as agreed, and threatened both to stop referring patients to Pacific Hospital and to terminate their relationship with the Dispensary Management Companies, defendant interceded to encourage the co-conspirators to make the payments and to resolve the dispute. In other cases, when certain kickback recipients did not refer as many patients to Pacific Hospital as the conspirators had expected, defendant encouraged the kickback recipients to increase their rate of referrals. Defendant also worked with other co-conspirators to

track the number of referrals from certain kickback recipients, to ensure they were given proper credit for those referrals. In addition, defendant worked with certain kickback recipients to arrange for them to refer patients to certain surgeons, who in turn had agreed to perform surgery on those patients at Pacific Hospital.

After defendant became the majority owner of IPM in August 2010 and assumed control of the company, he continued to coordinate with certain kickback recipients to ensure that they continued referring patients to Pacific Hospital and that, in return, Drobot Senior and his co-conspirators continued to pay kickbacks, in some cases through IPM.

B. The Dispensary Management Companies

The Dispensary Management Companies contracted with doctors and chiropractors to manage in-house pharmaceutical dispensaries located in doctors' and chiropractors' offices. Under the terms of many of the contracts entered into by the parties, the doctor received either the net monthly collections of the dispensary after paying to the Dispensary Management Companies a percentage-based management fee, or a fixed monthly amount secured by the dispensary's future collections. The contracts typically provided that the Dispensary Management Companies would advance nearly all costs associated with the dispensary, including if necessary, the purchase of prescription drugs, and the salaries of pharmacy technicians who staffed the dispensary, with the doctors ultimately responsible for any shortfalls if the amounts collected were less than the amounts advanced.

In practice, and as defendant sometimes promised the doctors, the Dispensary Management Companies would not require doctors to

repay any shortfalls, to the extent any such shortfalls occurred. The doctors were often advanced a certain minimum monthly payment, and were required to do little more than write prescriptions meant to be filled at the dispensary. Thus, some doctors who entered into contracts with the Dispensary Management Companies assumed little, if any, financial risk related to the in-house dispensary.

In the event that collections from an in-house dispensary dropped below the amount anticipated by the Dispensary Management Companies, defendant or others from the Dispensary Management Companies would, at times, encourage doctors to cause more patients to fill prescriptions at the doctor's dispensary, or to cause patients to fill more profitable prescriptions at the doctor's dispensary. If collections did not increase, the guaranteed monthly payment to that doctor would be reduced in some cases, or the doctor's contract would be terminated in other cases.

In some instances, the Dispensary Management Companies influenced doctors to make available in the dispensary, and to prescribe to appropriate patients, specific medications that were promoted by the Dispensary Management Companies based on the anticipated profit generated when those medications were prescribed to worker's compensation patients. This was accomplished through several mechanisms, including by contractual language (in the case of Surgeon D), by emphasizing the higher reimbursement rate associated with a particular medication versus an alternative, or by offering to increase or maintain a doctor's guaranteed monthly payment.

With respect to at least two doctors, defendant attempted to leverage the referral of potential spinal surgery patients for the benefit of the Dispensary Management Companies, either by

guaranteeing those referrals in return for a doctor's agreement to engage the Dispensary Management Companies, or by threatening to withdraw those referrals if the doctor terminated his contract with the Dispensary Management Companies.

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In those instances where defendant operated the Dispensary

Management Companies in the means identified above, defendant

intended to incentivize and reward doctors for writing prescriptions
to patients that would be filled in the doctors' in-house pharmacy.

Finally, on a number of occasions, defendant improperly induced doctors who contracted with the Dispensary Management Companies to use ancillary products and services offered by defendant, Medi-Lab Corporation ("Medi-Lab"), or companies affiliated with defendant. Those ancillary products and services included toxicology, magnetic resonance imaging, and Lanx spinal hardware (in the case of Medical Practice A located in Elmhurst, Illinois), none of which had any relation to the in-house dispensary program. Defendant induced the ancillary referrals either by increasing the guaranteed monthly payment for doctors with dispensary accounts in good standing, or by agreeing to maintain the existing quaranteed monthly payment for doctors whose guaranteed monthly payment amount was not commensurate with actual collection amounts. In return for referrals to Medi-Lab, defendant received a monthly payment from Medi-Lab designed, at least in part, to reimburse defendant for the kickback payments he had made to induce referrals to Medi-Lab.

In furtherance of the conspiracy and to accomplish the objects of the conspiracy, defendant and other co-conspirators committed various overt acts within the Central District of California, including but not limited to the following:

Overt Act No. 1

In or around March 2008, after Drobot Senior caused IPM to pay \$60,000 to Surgeon A as a kickback for spinal surgeries Surgeon A performed at Pacific Hospital, defendant sought reimbursement for IPM from PSPM for the kickback payment made by IPM.

Overt Act No. 2

On or about May 12, 2008, Drobot Senior caused IPM to pay \$35,000 to Chiropractor A, of which \$18,000 represented a kickback for spinal surgeries performed at Pacific Hospital on patients referred by Chiropractor A.

Overt Act No. 3

On or about July 29, 2008, defendant sent an email message to Executive A requesting a \$60,000 payment from Pacific Hospital to IPM as reimbursement for kickbacks paid by IPM for spinal surgeries performed at Pacific Hospital, including \$18,000 IPM had paid to Chiropractor A in kickbacks.

Overt Act No. 4

On or about March 10, 2009, defendant advised Executive B that Surgeon B was estimated to perform three to four spinal surgeries per month at Pacific Hospital on patients referred to Surgeon B by Dr. Philip Sobol, which referrals were caused by kickbacks paid to Dr. Philip Sobol.

Overt Act No. 5

On or about June 15, 2011, defendant received an email message from Pacific Hospital CFO James Canedo listing spinal surgeries performed by, among others, Surgeon C, Surgeon D, and Surgeon E, which were referred to Pacific Hospital by Dr. Philip Sobol, as a result of kickbacks paid to Dr. Philip Sobol.

Overt Act No. 6

On or about April 30, 2012, defendant caused IPM to pay \$155,000 to Surgeon F, of which \$30,000 represented a kickback for spinal surgeries performed at Pacific Hospital, either by Surgeon F or by surgeons to whom Surgeon F referred surgical candidates.

Overt Act No. 7

On or about May 24, 2012, defendant caused IPM to pay \$140,000 to Dr. Philip Sobol, of which \$60,000 represented a kickback for spinal surgeries performed at Pacific Hospital, either by Dr. Philip Sobol or by surgeons to whom Dr. Philip Sobol referred surgical candidates.

Overt Act No. 8

On or about July 2, 2012, Drobot Senior caused PSPM to pay \$23,706.80 to Surgeon B for performing surgeries at Pacific Hospital and for referring surgical candidates to Surgeon G for spinal surgeries at Pacific Hospital, including on patients covered by the FECA and CWCS.

C. Physicians Pain Specialists Of Alabama

Prior to May 20, 2015, Xiulu Ruan, M.D. and John Patrick Couch, M.D. jointly owned and operated Physicians Pain Specialists of Alabama ("PPSA"), a pain management clinic in Mobile, Alabama. At PPSA, Dr. Ruan and Dr. Couch treated workers' compensation patients whose medical services and prescriptions were paid for by state and federal workers' compensation insurance providers.

In March 2011, both Dr. Ruan and Dr. Couch entered into contracts with IPM pursuant to which IPM assumed management of a pre-existing pharmaceutical dispensary within PPSA. The contracts called for IPM to purchase claims arising from the dispensary in exchange

for certain minimum monthly payments to Dr. Ruan and Dr. Couch, beginning at \$45,000 to Dr. Ruan and \$18,000 to Dr. Couch. Defendant signed these contracts on behalf of IPM. The guaranteed payments were offered to, and did, induce Dr. Ruan and Dr. Couch to enter into the contracts, and were made by IPM to induce and in exchange for the doctors' in-house dispensing business. Regardless of the actual number of referrals Dr. Ruan and Dr. Couch made to the dispensary in a given month, the doctors each received at least the guaranteed amount.

Thus, defendant knowingly and willfully offered and paid remunerations to Dr. Ruan and Dr. Couch, at least in part, to induce and in exchange for their referral of patients to the IPM-managed dispensary for goods or items that were paid for, in whole or in part, by a federal healthcare program.

SENTENCING FACTORS

23. Defendant understands that in determining defendant's sentence the Court is required to calculate the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range and to consider that range, possible departures under the Sentencing Guidelines, and the other sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Defendant understands that the Sentencing Guidelines are advisory only, that defendant cannot have any expectation of receiving a sentence within the calculated Sentencing Guidelines range, and that after considering the Sentencing Guidelines and the other § 3553(a) factors, the Court will be free to exercise its discretion to impose any sentence it finds appropriate up to the maximum set by statute for the crimes of conviction.

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24. Defendant and the USAO agree to the following applicable Sentencing Guidelines factors:

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Base Offense Level:
                                     [U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(a)(2)]
Specific Offense
Characteristics
  Loss between
  $20M to $50M:
                                     [U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(L)]
                               +22
 More than 10 victims:
                                    [U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(B)]
                               +2
 Federal health care
 offense with gov't
 program loss of
 between $1M-$7M:
                               +2
                                   [U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(7)]
Adjustments
 Aggravating Role:
                               +2
                                   [U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a)]
 Acceptance of
                                   [U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1]
 Responsibility:
                               -3
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Total: 31

25. The USAO will agree to a two-level downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility (and, if applicable, move for an additional one-level downward adjustment under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b)) only if the conditions set forth in paragraph 6(c)) are met. Subject to paragraph 7 above and paragraph 37 below, defendant and the USAO agree not to seek, argue, or suggest in any way, either orally or in writing, that any other specific offense characteristics, adjustments, or departures relating to the offense level be imposed. Defendant agrees, however, that if, after signing this agreement but prior to sentencing, defendant were to commit an act, or the USAO were to discover a previously undiscovered act committed by defendant prior to signing this agreement, which act, in the judgment of the USAO, constituted obstruction of justice within the meaning of

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- U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, the USAO would be free to seek the enhancement set forth in that section.
- 26. Defendant understands that there is no agreement as to defendant's criminal history or criminal history category.
- 27. Defendant and the USAO reserve the right to argue for a sentence outside the sentencing range established by the Sentencing Guidelines based on the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(3), (a)(6), and (a)(7).

WAIVER OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

- 28. Defendant understands that by pleading guilty, defendant gives up the following rights:
 - a. The right to persist in a plea of not guilty.
 - b. The right to a speedy and public trial by jury.
- c. The right to be represented by counsel and if necessary have the court appoint counsel at trial. Defendant understands, however, that, defendant retains the right to be represented by counsel and if necessary have the court appoint counsel at every other stage of the proceeding.
- d. The right to be presumed innocent and to have the burden of proof placed on the government to prove defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
- e. The right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against defendant.
- f. The right to testify and to present evidence in opposition to the charges, including the right to compel the attendance of witnesses to testify.

h. Any and all rights to pursue any affirmative defenses, Fourth Amendment or Fifth Amendment claims, and other pretrial motions that have been filed or could be filed.

WAIVER OF APPEAL OF CONVICTION

29. Defendant understands that, with the exception of an appeal based on a claim that defendant's guilty pleas were involuntary, by pleading guilty defendant is waiving and giving up any right to appeal defendant's convictions on the offenses to which defendant is pleading guilty.

LIMITED MUTUAL WAIVER OF APPEAL OF SENTENCE

30. Defendant agrees that, provided the Court imposes a total term of imprisonment on all counts of conviction of no more than the low end of the Guidelines range corresponding to a total offense level of 31 and the criminal history category determined by the Court, defendant gives up the right to appeal all of the following:

(a) the procedures and calculations used to determine and impose any portion of the sentence; (b) the term of imprisonment imposed by the Court; (c) the fine imposed by the court, provided it is within the statutory maximum; (d) the amount and terms of any restitution order, provided it requires payment of no more than \$20 million; (e) the term of probation or supervised release imposed by the Court, provided it is within the statutory maximum; and (f) any of the following conditions of probation or supervised release imposed by the Court: the conditions set forth in General Orders 318, 01-05, and/or 05-02 of this Court; the drug testing conditions mandated by

18 U.S.C. §§ 3563(a)(5) and 3583(d); and the alcohol and drug use conditions authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(7).

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31. The USAO agrees that, provided (a) all portions of the sentence are at or below the statutory maximum specified above and (b) the Court imposes a term of imprisonment of no less than the low end of the Guidelines range corresponding to an offense level of 31 and the criminal history category determined by the Court, the USAO gives up its right to appeal any portion of the sentence, with the exception that the USAO reserves the right to appeal the amount of restitution ordered if that amount is less than \$20 million.

RESULT OF WITHDRAWAL OF GUILTY PLEA

Defendant agrees that if, after entering guilty pleas 32. pursuant to this agreement, defendant seeks to withdraw and succeeds in withdrawing defendant's guilty pleas on any basis other than a claim and finding that entry into this plea agreement was involuntary, then (a) the USAO will be relieved of all of its obligations under this agreement, including in particular its obligations regarding the use of Cooperation Information; (b) in any investigation, criminal prosecution, or civil, administrative, or regulatory action, defendant agrees that any Cooperation Information and any evidence derived from any Cooperation Information shall be admissible against defendant, and defendant will not assert, and hereby waives and gives up, any claim under the United States Constitution, any statute, or any federal rule, that any Cooperation Information or any evidence derived from any Cooperation Information should be suppressed or is inadmissible; and (c) should the USAO choose to pursue any charge or any civil, administrative, or regulatory action that was either dismissed or not filed as a result

of this agreement, then (i) any applicable statute of limitations will be tolled between the date of defendant's signing of this agreement and the filing commencing any such action; and (ii) defendant waives and gives up all defenses based on the statute of limitations, any claim of pre-indictment delay, or any speedy trial claim with respect to any such action, except to the extent that such defenses existed as of the date of defendant's signing this agreement.

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EFFECTIVE DATE OF AGREEMENT

33. This agreement is effective upon signature and execution of all required certifications by defendant, defendant's counsel, and an Assistant United States Attorney.

BREACH OF AGREEMENT

Defendant agrees that if defendant, at any time after the 34. signature of this agreement and execution of all required certifications by defendant, defendant's counsel, and an Assistant United States Attorney, knowingly violates or fails to perform any of defendant's obligations under this agreement ("a breach"), the USAO may declare this agreement breached. For example, if defendant knowingly, in an interview, before a grand jury, or at trial, falsely accuses another person of criminal conduct or falsely minimizes defendant's own role, or the role of another, in criminal conduct, defendant will have breached this agreement. All of defendant's obligations are material, a single breach of this agreement is sufficient for the USAO to declare a breach, and defendant shall not be deemed to have cured a breach without the express agreement of the USAO in writing. If the USAO declares this agreement breached, and the Court finds such a breach to have occurred, then:

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- b. The USAO will be relieved of all its obligations under this agreement; in particular, the USAO: (i) will no longer be bound by any agreements concerning sentencing and will be free to seek any sentence up to the statutory maximum for the crimes to which defendant has pleaded guilty; (ii) will no longer be bound by any agreements regarding criminal prosecution, and will be free to criminally prosecute defendant for any crime, including charges that the USAO would otherwise have been obligated not to criminally prosecute pursuant to this agreement; and (iii) will no longer be bound by any agreement regarding the use of Cooperation Information and will be free to use any Cooperation Information in any way in any investigation, criminal prosecution, or civil, administrative, or regulatory action.
- c. The USAO will be free to criminally prosecute defendant for false statement, obstruction of justice, and perjury based on any knowingly false or misleading statement by defendant.
- d. In any investigation, criminal prosecution, or civil, administrative, or regulatory action: (i) defendant will not assert, and hereby waives and gives up, any claim that any Cooperation Information was obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination; and (ii) defendant agrees that any Cooperation Information and any Plea Information, as well as any evidence derived from any Cooperation Information or any Plea Information, shall be admissible against defendant, and defendant will not assert, and hereby waives and gives up, any claim

under the United States Constitution, any statute, Rule 410 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 11(f) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, or any other federal rule, that any Cooperation Information, any Plea Information, or any evidence derived from any Cooperation Information or any Plea Information should be suppressed or is inadmissible.

- 35. Following the Court's finding of a knowing breach of this agreement by defendant, should the USAO choose to pursue any charge or any civil, administrative, or regulatory action that was either dismissed or not filed as a result of this agreement, then:
- a. Defendant agrees that any applicable statute of limitations is tolled between the date of defendant's signing of this agreement and the filing commencing any such action.
- b. Defendant waives and gives up all defenses based on the statute of limitations, any claim of pre-indictment delay, or any speedy trial claim with respect to any such action, except to the extent that such defenses existed as of the date of defendant's signing this agreement.

COURT AND PROBATION OFFICE NOT PARTIES

- 36. Defendant understands that the Court and the United States Probation Office are not parties to this agreement and need not accept any of the USAO's sentencing recommendations or the parties' agreements to facts or sentencing factors.
- 37. Defendant understands that both defendant and the USAO are free to: (a) supplement the facts by supplying relevant information to the United States Probation Office and the Court, and (b) correct any and all factual misstatements relating to the Court's Sentencing Guidelines calculations and determination of sentence. While this

paragraph permits both the USAO and defendant to submit full and complete factual information to the United States Probation Office and the Court, even if that factual information may be viewed as inconsistent with the facts agreed to in this agreement, this paragraph does not affect defendant's and the USAO's obligations not to contest the facts agreed to in this agreement.

38. Defendant understands that even if the Court ignores any sentencing recommendation, finds facts or reaches conclusions different from those agreed to, and/or imposes any sentence up to the maximum established by statute, defendant cannot, for that reason, withdraw defendant's guilty pleas, and defendant will remain bound to fulfill all defendant's obligations under this agreement. Defendant understands that no one -- not the prosecutor, defendant's attorney, or the Court -- can make a binding prediction or promise regarding the sentence defendant will receive, except that it will be within the statutory maximum.

NO ADDITIONAL AGREEMENTS

39. Defendant understands that, except as set forth herein, there are no promises, understandings, or agreements between the USAO and defendant or defendant's attorney, and that no additional promise, understanding, or agreement may be entered into unless in a writing signed by all parties or on the record in court.

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PLEA AGREEMENT PART OF THE GUILTY PLEA HEARING

The parties agree that this agreement will be considered part of the record of defendant's guilty plea hearing as if the entire agreement had been read into the record of the proceeding. AGREED AND ACCEPTED UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA EILEEN M. DECKER United States Attorney 1/27/16 Date SCOTT D. TENLEY Assistant United States Attorney MICHAEL R. DROBOT Defendant JÁSON DE BRETTEVILLE Attorney for Defendant MICHAEL R. DROBOT

CERTIFICATION OF DEFENDANT

I have read this agreement in its entirety. I have had enough time to review and consider this agreement, and I have carefully and thoroughly discussed every part of it with my attorney. I understand the terms of this agreement, and I voluntarily agree to those terms. I have discussed the evidence with my attorney, and my attorney has advised me of my rights, of possible pretrial motions that might be filed, of possible defenses that might be asserted either prior to or at trial, of the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), of relevant Sentencing Guidelines provisions, and of the consequences of entering into this agreement. No promises, inducements, or representations of any kind have been made to me other than those contained in this agreement. No one has threatened or forced me in any way to enter into this agreement. I am satisfied with the representation of my attorney in this matter, and I am pleading quilty because I am guilty of the charges and wish to take advantage of the promises set forth in this agreement, and not for any other reason.

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20	MICHAEL R. DROBOT Defendant

1-26-15 Date

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CERTIFICATION OF DEFENDANT'S ATTORNEY

I am MICHAEL R. DROBOT's attorney. I have carefully and thoroughly discussed every part of this agreement with my client. Further, I have fully advised my client of his rights, of possible pretrial motions that might be filed, of possible defenses that might be asserted either prior to or at trial, of the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), of relevant Sentencing Guidelines provisions, and of the consequences of entering into this agreement. To my knowledge: no promises, inducements, or representations of any kind have been made to my client other than those contained in this agreement; no one has threatened or forced my client in any way to enter into this agreement; my client's decision to enter into this agreement is an informed and voluntary one; and the factual basis set forth in this agreement is sufficient to support my client's entry of guilty pleas pursuant to this agreement.

JÁSON DE BRETTEVILLE

Attorney for Defendant MICHAEL R. DROBOT